From Informal Renewal to Formal Renewal: Governance of Collectively Owned Industrial Land Renewal Based on a Case Study of Guangzhou
Yao Zhihao, Tian Li
Abstract In China there have been two models of stock land renewal: formal renewal and informal renewal, and there have been a wealth of studies on formal renewal. However, few studies have addressed informal renewal, as well as the governance logic behind the renewal model. Based on the analysis of policy documents, extensive interviews and a case study of Guangzhou, we explore the evolution, governance logic, consequence of renewal, and governance dilemmas of collectively owned industrial land renewal since 2000. Through redefining the land development rights of stock collectively owned land and reducing the transaction cost of land use change, informal renewal activities of collective industrial land have been legalized from top to bottom. Meanwhile, informal renewal meets local governments’ demand for rural industrialization transition. The empirical study of Panyu District in Guangzhou shows that owing to lacking policy resilience, ineffective planning control, and village collectives’ dependence on the rental economy, collective industrial land renewal results in frequent interest conflicts and continuation of transfer and lease, presenting a real estate-oriented feature. Therefore, the renewal policy should be innovated in terms of differentiated policy design, a balance of interests, and through improvement of the transfer and transaction mechanism, to strengthen informal renewal management.

Keywords collectively owned industrial land; informal renewal; formal renewal; governance; Guangzhou


1. Introduction    

Stock collectively owned industrial land (hereafter CIL) in this paper refers to village collectives’ construction land that was or is mainly used for profitable use, such as industry, storage, and logistics. After the 2008 global financial crisis, the Pearl River Delta region has witnessed an accelerated industrial transformation and upgrading of traditional manufacturing businesses, while fragmented collective industrial plotsgradually fail to adapt to the transformation of regional functions. Currently, Guangdong Province is making effort to push forward the system and mechanism reform of high-quality development. The redevelopment of CIL – carrier of the“land-industry-capital” linkage development is significant for promoting urban industry and space transformation, to achieve the high-quality urban development.    


There are two models of stock land renewal, formal renewal and informal renewal, differentiated with whether the renewal in accordance with government’s planning control. Led by the government, formal renewal achieves land property right transaction and functional reconfiguration through land purchase and transfer. It is featured by land use change and reconstruction based on definite land property rights and planning control requirements (Ding and Liu, 2018). Although formal renewal can obtain the highest economic benefits, the government faces multiple challenges like planning regulatory, property right constraints, and high transaction costs (Feng and Tang, 2013). Informal renewal can be classified into two types: the first type changes land function through renovation instead of demolition and reconstruction on condition that original land property rights remain unchanged; another approach is spontaneously implemented by village collectives, unauthorized by the government and inconsistent with planning control. As village collectives are dependent on stable collective social network and rental income, and the stock CIL indeed plays an important role for the survival of micro and small manufacturing enterprises. Local governments have difficulty in obtaining land development rights through bulldozer demolition and reconstruction. Under the dual constraints of land property rights transaction and development costs, stock CIL renewal is often carried out in an informal way that still retain collective ownership.    


Relevant studies confirm that stakeholders in village renewal normally do not have balanced rights and responsibilities, and that local governments have a significant influence on renewal results via planning and policy intervention (Li and Li, 2011; Wu, 2015). In fact, the renewal of CIL is a process with multiple-party interaction, in both “top-down” and “bottom-up” ways (Yuan, Qian, and Guo, 2015; Wei, Meng, and Deng, 2017; Yao and Tian, 2018). However, few studies have addressed informal renewal. In addition, existing research on the management of CIL renewal focuses on theoretical perspectives of property rights, transaction costs, and governance models, whereas few literature probe into the governance logic behind the renewal model. This paper focuses on the governance logic, consequence of renewal, and governance dilemmas of CIL renewal in the period of renewal transition. We first discuss the characteristics of informal renewal and stock land governance, then retrospect the evolution of CIL renewal models in Guangzhou since 2000, and analyze the governance logic behind the evolution from the perspective of land development rights governance. Furthermore, with the practice in Panyu District, Guangzhou as an example, we examine the governance dilemmas of CIL renewal, and put forward corresponding suggestions for the stock CIL management.    


2. Informal renewal and management of stock land    

Collective land is collectively owned and developed, and benefits the collective, which contributes to the idea that collective land property rights are perceived as the private property of the village collective. The local-based rural social relations, clan relations, and villagers’ perception of private land ownership provide support for collectives’ informal land development behaviors (Yao et al., 2020). As informal collective land development is often associated with illegal construction, it leads to the formation of informal land development rights (Zhang, 2018). Wu Fulong et al. (2013) believe that the retention of collective land property rights, loose land management and development control, informal public service provision, and ambiguous rural management result in the continuation of informal development in urban villages. Although formal development through demolition and reconstruction eliminates informality, it leads to the duplication of shanty towns in more distant villages (Zhang et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2013).    


The transaction cost is high during the top-down land redevelopment. When lacking an efficient formal renewal system design, bottom-up informal renewal emerges to meet the market demand for land resources as a sub-optimal option. The emergence of informal renewal is a result that the planning and management of stock land renewal lag behind the actual demand, and absence of land redevelopment control rules and interest regulation mechanism also contributes to its widespread use (He, 2010; Liang, Sun, and Jiang, 2018). Owing to its low transaction cost and high flexibility, informal renewal has become a continuation of informal development while it meets local governments’ demands for low investment and high efficiency for stock land management. Driven by market inducement and demand of property holders, informal renewal becomes a “mainstream” measure for industrial land redevelopment that original land owners or land use right holders usually acts as leading role. It is often associated with “temporary use” or “interim use” of land. As an adaptive policy tool, temporary land use permits break the institutional constraints of land development (Liu and Wang, 2015; Yang, 2019; Li, Chen, Tang, et al., 2018).    


In practice, there are various informal renewal activities like urban village renewal without permission, retrofitting of villas, functional transformation of industrial land, and renewal of creative parks. In fact, informal renewal is not necessarily identified as illegal behavior out of local governance. Instead, many redevelopment cases that do not change land property rights are in fact supported by the government. Most of the early industrial land renewal projects in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and so on conducted informal renewal in the name of “suppressing the secondary industry and developing the tertiary industry (tuier jinsan),” as well as developing creative industries. The Three-Olds Renewal policy (old village, old factory, and old town, hereafter TOR) in Guangdong allows village collectives to retain ownership for self-redevelopment, which breaks the government’s monopoly on land development rights. One of its potential intentions is to promote the “legalization” of informal renewal. In recent years, Shenzhen advocated organic renewal, allowing the government to rent the property of urban villages after clarification of property right and implement comprehensive renovation for public housing. For example, the renewal of the Ningmeng Apartment in Shuiwei Village did not follow the traditional approach of demolition and reconstruction, instead it went through four stages: shifting use rights from villagers to the collective, upgrading and renewal, construction and approval, and apartment allocation. Through this way, the government took the initiative to strengthen the informal property rights security and spatial quality of informal housing (Li, Tong, Wu, et al., 2019).    


Although the transaction cost of informal renewal is low, the hidden institutional costs and social risks cannot be ignored, such as illegal renewal and land rent-seeking behaviors owing to ambiguous regulations and policies (Zhao and Wang, 2018). In terms of social equity, most land value-added income from informal renewal goes to land owners and investors, whereas little is used to provide urban public interests and the common good. Owing to the government’s lax governance upon informal renewal, speculators often perceive that the government has tacitly approved small property right housing. Compared with formal renewal led by the government, informal renewal generates more complicated conflicts among village collectives, enterprises, and developers over land development mode, compensation scheme, and interest distribution. While delegating land development right to original owners or the market entity, informal renewal must take interests of all stakeholders into consideration and avoid policy speculation, to balance interests between individual, collective, and the public.    


3. Evolution and governance logic of the CIL renewal model    

Since the 1980s, rural areas in Guangzhou have undergone a bottom-up transformation from township/village enterprises (TVEs) development to a rental economy development. By the end of 2018, there were 2,705 collective industrial parks spatially dispersed over 1,144 administrative villages, with a total area of about 132 km22, accounting for approximately 30% of the city’s total industrial land area. How to revitalize the low-efficient land has become a tough issue for Guangzhou’s urban development. Since 2000, urban renewal policy in Guangzhou has experienced transition from government-dominated renewal to cooperative renewal between government and developers, along with the CIL renewal models changed.    


3.1 Evolution of the CIL renewal model in Guangzhou since 2000    

3.1.1 2000 – 2009: bottom-up informal renewal in the context of the industry and labor transfer strategy    

Before 2009, the renewal of old collective-owned factories in Guangzhou was generally spontaneous. In some villages of peripheral areas in Panyu and Baiyun districts, the village collective or tenants spontaneously carried out physical renewal of old collective-owned factories, in order to attract well-known enterprises and to increase the rental income from these properties. In essence, this type of renewal is informal. It does not involve the change and legalization of land or real estate property rights, but is only limited to land plot renewal, without public space and facility contribution. Even if some collective land is changed from industrial to commercial use, it has not obtained recognition from planning authority. After renewal, collective-owned real estate can only apply for a Certificate for Temporary Use that is only valid for three years, rather than a formal industrial and commercial business license and fire prevention certification. An investigation conducted by the former Guangzhou Urban Renewal Bureau shows that owing to government’s lax planning control, over 80% of temporary renewal projects of old collective-owned factories are not in accordance with regulatory planning, and that it is common that the procedure of land use formality cannot be completed. Accordingly, they can only be used as interim use for small or medium-sized enterprises, and thus fail to attract large enterprises to settle in (Cen et al., 2017). Profit-seeking village collectives, which are main actors of village renewal, carry out renewal projects under the name of the “industry and labor transfer” strategy, accompanied by illegal renewal under the pretext of developing a “creative industry park” (Zeng, 2010).    


3.1.2 2009 – 2016: top-down formal renewal under the "Three-Olds Renewal" policy    

In 2009, Guangzhou launched the initiative of TOR, village collectives could either carry out renewal by themselves or cooperatewith market entities in accordance with their economic and operating capabilities. CIL renewal projects could adopt a model which allows to retain collective property rights (for lease or sale), or could convert to state ownership and transfer the land to the government. The TOR institutional changes are made not in the delineation of land property rights but instead in the redistribution of the benefits to be made from land redevelopment (Lin, 2015), and many renewal projects still remain collective land ownership. Compared with the bottom-up informal renewal during the “industry and labortransfer” period, informal renewal in this period was essentially a top-down approach led by the government which has discretionary power in terms of renewal projects selection and management, land use permission for illegal land, approval of renewal implementation plans, and so on. Renewal schemes must conform to statutory plans such as the regulatory plan, meet the standards for urban development, and aim to improve local public space and infrastructure.The goal of CIL renewal is still to promote industrial transformation and upgrading, encourage “industrial-to-industrial” functional transformation, andstrictly control real estate and commercial property development. In 2016, Guangzhou proposed a “patchwork renovation” approach to promote renewal efficiency, making it easier to conduct village-level industrial park renewal. Featured by small-scale investment, patchwork renovation does not involve the change of property owners and landownership, and formalizes the temporary renewal activity before the TOR. Patchwork renovation projects with approval can change land use by paying a lower land premium, thus reducing the financial pressure for enterprises self-redevelopment (Cen et al., 2017).    


3.1.3 2017 –  present: a combination of formal and informal renewal    

Although TOR has been supported by the government, village-level industrial park renewal has not achieved expected effect. Village collectives focus more on whether they can still obtain the rental income and dividends in a long term after the renewal, so most CIL renewal projects do not convert land ownership to state-owned, but rather alter land use and industry restructure via circulation. Most land value increment flows back to original land rights holders and investors, with only limited part going to the public.The No. 6 document issued in 2017 loosened the contiguous renewal of CIL with a land area of 0.1 km2 and above. The government would invite investment for industrial developmentand encourage collective land to be transferred to the state and conduct formalrenewal. In 2019 Guangzhou delineated the protection line of the industrial zone and strengthened land use control of CIL within its industrial protection zone. The No. 9 Document specifies different renewal plans for different types of land, to either “shutdown, transfer land use, or transform and upgrade.” The renewal of village-level industrial parks outside the industrial protection zone adopts the model of shutting down or transferring functions, and this kind of renewal would inevitably bring about land ownership and function change as formal renewal. Village-level industrial parks within the industrial protection zone will be guided to achieve functional enhancement through demolition and reconstruction or comprehensive renovation via “industrial-to-industrial” or“industrial-to-new industry” transformation, with land ownership and land use unchanged by informal renewal approach. Delineating the spatial boundaries between formal and informal renewal projects will help to tailor policies according to local conditions and will help to clarify the path for village-level industrial park patchwork renovation. The new policy encourages village collectives and market players to engage in renewal by relaxing rules on illegal land left over by history when it completes the construction permission. For the illegal collective land that is going to complete the construction permission, it will only need to transfer 20% of land area for profitable use to the government (or equivalent currency), and the remaining land can be redeveloped by the village collective.    


3.2 Rationale of the collectively owned industrial land renewal model    

In the context of institutional transition, CILrenewal has gone through bottom-up informal to top-down formal renewal transition, with differences in terms of renewal conditions, land development rights, the benefit distribution, transaction cost, and consequence of renewal (see Table 1). It is found that village collective-led informal renewal doesnot involve property right change and illegal land right confirmation. After renewal, the industrial park is still home to low-end industries, which obviously fails to meet the goal of the “industry and labor transfer” strategy. Guided by the TOR, on the one hand, informal renewal empowers village collectives to develop land, avoiding the transaction cost needed for the government to intervene in collective communities to promote land rights reconfiguration; on the other hand, the government can intervene in the spontaneous renewal of village collective land through land use control. For instance, government can regulate and control the renewal scale, infrastructure support, type of industries, and land use functions through statutory planning and textual rules. Government’s value judgment as well as political and economic interests in urban renewal are performed by renewal planning and land profit-sharing scheme. Under the strategy of risk-aversion and self-reliance for rental economy, village collectives prefer to retain land ownership and development rights, rather than have land transferred to the state (Yao and Tian, 2020), the government-dominated formal renewal faces high economic and administrative costs.    


Table 1 Comparison on informal and formal renewal models in Guangzhou



The transaction cost has been the core element influencing what renewal model and path to choose. Land development rights have both public and private attributes (Liu, 2011). Private right originates from the property attribute of land, and public right originates from the state regulatory power intervening in the externality of land use. Stock land renewal triggers collective land properties tilting towards public right from private right, and institutional and capital supplies act as external forces to reduce the transaction cost of land right reconfiguration (see Figure 1). “Patchwork renovation,” as a compromise renewal path, combines multiple considerations like reducing the transaction cost during renewal, realizing land function replacement, and safeguarding public interests, on the condition that village collectives have right to carry out renewal by themselves and do not reduce collective rental income.    


Figure 1 The governance framework of land development right for collectively owned industrial land renewal in Guangzhou        


4. Governance in CIL renewal: a case study of Panyu District, Guangzhou            


4.1 CIL renewal from 2009 to 2017            

As a suburban area in the south of Guangzhou centralcity, Panyu is a traditional rural industrialized area in the Pearl River Delta region. By 2018, there were more than 200 village-level industrial parks in 177 administrative villages in the district, covering a total land area of about 21.8 km22. From 2009 to 2017, a total of 31 old collective-owned factory renewal projects in Panyu District were included in the annual plan of the TOR, accounting for 28.1% of the total CIL. Among them, ten old collective-owned factories carried out renewal independently, and 21 projects, together with village homestead land implemented comprehensive renewal (see Figure 2 & Table 2). Meanwhile, only three renewal projects (Longqi Village, Luoxi Village, and Dongjiao Village) were approved from 2009 to 2015. After Guangzhou proposed “patchwork renovation” in 2016, the pace of renewal was accelerated, and 28 new projects were included into the renewal plan in the following two years.            



Figure 2 Spatial distribution of collectively owned industrial land renewal projects in Panyu District, Guangzhou from 2009 to 2017
Source: Drawn by the author based on the data of renewal projects.


Table 2 Implementation progress of 31 projects in Panyu District, Guangzhou by the end of 2017            



Among the 31 planned renewal projects, we collected 18 cases with complete data. It is found that the proportion of collectively owned construction land decreases from 93.1% to 61.2%. After renewal, 23.8% of the land was conveyed to the government for building public facilities and municipal infrastructure without any compensation. The average FAR (floor area ratio) of collective land increased from 0.82 to 2.2. However, only three renewal projects (Longqi Liyuan Xintiandi, Luoxi Fisherman’s Wharf, and Shengtai plot in Dongjiao Village) were completed by the end of 2017; anotherf ive projects entered the renewal planning adjustment stage via a vote at the villagers’ representative meeting; and the remaining 23 projects were still in the negotiation stage. Only 6.04% of the total area entered implementation stage, and 71.9% of the old collective-owned factory area has not started renewal yet.            


4.2 Dilemma of CIL renewal            

4.2.1 High land renewal transaction cost due to interest conflicts            

Due to absence of interest negotiation mechanism, the government-dominated renewal of CIL in Guangzhou is caught up in a game of multiple interest conflicts as a result of a rigid renewal threshold and benefit distribution rules. Firstly, the collective and the public may disagree on how to deal with a piece of illegal land. A large amount of illegal land needs to confirm its land rights. Current policy requires that illegal land engaging in renewal needs to deduce its reserved commercial land index after land right confirmation, and transfer 30% of the land or property area to the government. A survey on villages in Panyu shows that most village collectives are reluctant to engage in the renewal; villages in good locations or with more stock collective-owned construction land quota have a “high expectation” for developing its collective economy. In addition, under the institution of village election in southern China, CIL renewal faces high internal transaction costs, leading to conflicts between individual and collective interests. Decisions on major matters, such as land property rights transfer or compensation & resettlement, should be subject to multiple rounds of voting by collective members, and it’s hard to reach over 90% consensus rate for implementation among the LSCs (Land Shareholding Cooperation). The average area of a single piece CIL is only 2.25 ha, making it difficult for a renewal planto be unanimously approved in village administrative level owing to itsfragmented property rights. Panyu District has not yet substantially established “urban renewal units” which combine surrounding state-owned land and collective-owned land to realize the transfer of land development rights. Accordingly, it is impossible to transfer rights and interests within CIL redevelopment and also hard to find external channels to resolve interest conflicts between natural villages.            


4.2.2 The impacts of reliance on the rental economy in renewal process            

There are two formal CIL renewal models: public sale and negotiated conveyance; and two informal models: renewal after circulation in terms of leasing; and renewal after circulation in terms of conveyance (see Table 3). Among 31 cases, only one project transferred collective land ownership to state-owned as a financing plot for public sale, while the rest of the projects adopted the land circulation model, to retain collective property rights. Village collectives hope to maintain a stable rental economy and are reluctant to undertake the risk of selling land publicly or transferring it to the market. Under the circulation model, the village collective can retain land development right, and take back land use rights and real estate on the land without compensation upon lease term expiration. However, the “contractual lease and free withdraw” property right disposal mode greatly reduces the collateral value of collective land and affects land use efficiency (Chen, 2017). Although collectively profitable construction land is legally permitted to enter into urban land market, it breaks the existing pattern of interest distribution, making it difficult for village collectives to accept “free circulation” instead of “paid circulation.” In Guangzhou, only Baiyun District has implemented a case of collectively profitable construction land conveyance through circulation till end of 2017. The renewal of CIL stops at land conveyance through circulation (a long-term market-oriented behavior), and there is still a long way to achieve formal renewal through land ownership change.            


Table 3 Comparison of collectively owned industrial land renewal models in China            


4.2.3 Deviation from the government's original intention due to the motivation of land rent maximization            

In 2016, the commercial housing inventory in Panyu District reached 4.47 km2, and the de-inventory target accounted for one fifth of the city’s total.To achieve the de-inventory target, the renewal of village-level industrial parks must avoid large-scale real estate development. However, most approved projects will transform from industrial to commercial use, which is contrary to the government’s expectation of industrial upgrading and not helpful to reduce the real estate inventory. In addition to the three “industrial-to-industrial” renewal projects in Nanpu, Fuchong, and Daling villages, the remaining 28 projects are all “industrial to commercial” or “industrial to residential” renewal, showing a significant real estate-orientated feature. Most projects are driven by transportation infrastructure construction, including the renewal of CIL in Yuangang, Xiecun, Longqi, Nancun, and Guantang villages. 26 out of 31 renewal projects are in urbanized villages with good economic locations. In contrast, the old collective-owned factories in a less favorable location like the suburb and outer suburban villages in eastern Panyu are not concerned by market entity due to low land benchmark price. Land rent derived from land use changes (industrial-to-commercial) are the driving force for village collectives and market players to engage in the renewal. The industrial transformation of industrial land affects the production and operation of enterprises, and there is no much room for FAR enhancement. Therefore, all parties are reluctant to carry out industry upgrading.            


4.3 Implications of good governance in the CIL renewal            

4.3.1 Establishing a classified implementation pathway for formal and informal renewal            

Demolition and reconstruction of CIL through formal renewal will bring about large scale commercial real estate projects. However, a large amount of CIL will continue to exist on the short term, and carry the existing stable economic and social relations in rural society. Consequently, cities should establish both formal and informal renewal channels for village-level industrial park renewal. It is crucial to optimize the government’s planning control, benefit coordination, the right and responsibility mechanism, and to coordinate two renewal models based on the needs of industrial upgrading and spatial transformation for avoiding low-cost informal renewal inhibiting high-cost formal renewal. Regulation of planning indicators, such as land use control, FAR transfer, and public housing provision should be strengthened for formal renewal projects outside the industrial protection zone. Projects within the industrial protection zone should be emphasized to identify the inefficient land via land use intensity and efficiency evaluation. Massive data upon land, buildings, and businesses can be applied together to propose classified renewal strategies.            


At present, informal renewal is a suboptimal option to adjust the land use pattern and improve economic performance of inefficient industrial land. Based on the existing urban renewal institution, local governments need to improve the governance of informal renewal to strictlycontrol land rent-seeking and forbid the development of small property rightshousing. It is particularly important for informal renewal to establish apragmatic partnership and a flexible decision-making mechanism among the government, land users, and market players (Li, Chen, Tang, et al., 2018). Besides the stakeholders of CIL renewal, we also need to pay attention to the demand of land tenants, as high-quality industrial resources are crucial to urban renewal (Zhou, Yang, Wang, et al., 2018). As a result, more efforts should be made to feed renewal benefits back to the enterprises, and to encourage formal renewal through self-redevelopment, joint renewal or long-term lease. In this way, CIL renewal can be redeveloped through bottom-up gradual approach rather than top-down elimination (Xu, 2015).            


4.3.2 Interest balance mechanism of the industry upgrading of village-level industrial parks            

The “industrial-to-industrial” renewal of CIL and the high-quality industrial space and industrial resource accumulation are key to rural transformation. To address the predicament that the industrial-to-industrial renewal lacks an internal driving force, it is imperative to explore an interest balance mechanism and to encourage the“industrial-to-industrial” renewal. We can learn from the policy on current pilot zone in Shunde, Foshan City. The land quota formed by village-level industrial parks consolidation is used to link the profitable land conveyance. Part of the land revenue from profitable land transfer will support the upgrading of village-level industrial parks in the industrial protection zone. The renewal of village-level industrial parks in the industrial protection zone adopts creative land supply methods like flexible industrial land transfer, transfer after leasing, and a combination of leasing and transfer, and sets up subdivided industrial land and real estate operation guidelines to support the “industrial-to-industrial” renewal (Deng, Wang, Deng, et al., 2019). In terms of land quota, CIL outside the industrial protection zone can be swapped with CIL within the zone to realize industrial space transfer. Besides, it is necessary to establish “industrial-to-industrial” transferring and reselling mechanisms of development rights and interests and a FAR adjustment mechanism. Village-level industrial parks that have been rebuilt, expanded, and upgraded need to further identify the proportion of industrial land, types of industrial land prohibited, and public service requirements, and other indicators, so as to transform traditional industrial parks to new industrial complexes and to enhance the industrial land value.            


4.3.3 Market-oriented allocation mechanism for collectively owned construction land            

The market-oriented allocation of CIL relies on an improvement of the separation of collective land ownership, land use right, land development right, and so on, as well as the reasonable distribution of value-added income from collective land redevelopment. In 2020, the amendment to the Land Management Law cleared the legal restrictions on collectively ownedconstruction land entering the market, it further requires legalizing the property rights of collectively owned construction land and improving the market-oriented collective land allocation mechanism. Since 2015, Nanhai District in the city of Foshan has successively introduced local collective land market system, such as trial measures for collective profitable land entering the market, trial measures for land increment income management and use of taxes and fees, and trial measures for management of mortgage financing. In addition, Nanhai initially established a collectively owned construction land benchmark price and rental system. By the end of April 2018, the number of collective-owned construction land plots entering the market in Nanhai had reached 86 plots, covering a total area of 1.61 km2. An emerging collectively owned construction land market has been gradually established along with the institutional evolution. Guangzhou has established a two level (district and town/street community) collective assets trading platform since 2013, which has made the CIL transaction open to the public.            


5. Conclusion            

The renewal of CIL in Guangzhou has undergone an evolution from informal to formal renewal, from village collective’s spontaneous renewal to government-dominated renewal. Local governments have been gradually strengthening planning control and interest regulation, as well as the management of informal renewal. Local government has been trying to reduce the transaction cost of property right transfer, and to promote the transformation of low-efficient land use. Land rent-driven CIL renewal presents property-led features, making it difficult to achieve the goal of industry upgrading. Under the welfare-oriented institution of collective community, the village collective tends to choose informal renewal – land transfer and lease with the lowest transaction cost and lowest risk. Under the goal of reducing inventory and protecting industry, CIL renewal policies should be improved and innovated through establishing a classified implementation channel, enhancing industry upgrading benefit, improving transaction mechanism of land circulation, and so on. A good governance in rural renewal needs to explore are fined and adaptive policy design with a goal of improving land use performance and reasonable distribution of land benefits. How to establish a consultative and dialogue-based governance mechanism among stakeholders to mitigate conflicts on interests and to promote diversification of renewal models needs further deep research.             



(This paper is based on a presentation made at the Annual Conference of Urban Regeneration Academic Committee, Urban Planning Society of China 2020: Urban Regeneration from the Perspective of Governance Innovation. Acknowledgements: This research is supported by grants from the National Key R&D Program of China (No: 2018YFD1100105), the Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science Project (20YJCZH214), and the Natural Foundation of Suzhou University of Science and Technology (XKQ2019005).)            




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Yao Zhihao, PhD, Lecturer, School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou, P. R. China.            


Tian Li (corresponding author), Professor, Deputy Head, Department of Urban Planning and Design, School of Architecture, Tsinghua University; Director, Research Center for Land Use and Housing Policy, Beijing, P. R. China. Email: litian262@126.com     


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